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Abstract. We consider the problem of secure identification: user U proves to server S that he knows
an agreed (possibly low-entropy) password w, while giving away as little information on w as possible,
namely the adversary can exclude at most one possible password for each execution of the scheme.
We propose a solution in the bounded-quantum-storage model, where U and S may exchange qubits,
and a dishonest party is assumed to have limited quantum memory. No other restriction is posed
upon the adversary. An improved version of the proposed identification scheme is also secure against a
man-in-the-middle attack, but requires U and S to additionally share a high-entropy key k. However,
security is still guaranteed if one party loses k to the attacker but notices the loss. In both versions
of the scheme, the honest participants need no quantum memory, and noise and imperfect quantum
sources can be tolerated. The schemes compose sequentially, and w and k can securely be re-used. A
small modification to the identification scheme results in a quantum-key-distribution (QKD) scheme,
secure in the bounded-quantum-storage model, with the same re-usability properties of the keys, and
without assuming authenticated channels. This is in sharp contrast to known QKD schemes (with
unbounded adversary) without authenticated channels, where authentication keys must be updated,
and unsuccessful executions can cause the parties to run out of keys.
1 Introduction
Secure Identification. Consider two parties, a user U and a server S, who share a common
secret-key (or password or Personal Identification Number PIN) w. In order to obtain some service
from S, U needs to convince S that he is the legitimate user U by “proving” that he knows w. In
practice—think of how you prove to the ATM that you know your PIN—such a proof is often done
simply by announcing w to S. This indeed guarantees that a dishonest user U∗ who does not know
w cannot identify himself as U, but of course incurs the risk that U might reveal w to a malicious
server S∗ who may now impersonate U. Thus, from a secure identification scheme we also require
that a dishonest server S∗ obtains (essentially) no information on w.
There exist various approaches to obtain secure identification schemes, depending on the setting
and the exact security requirements. For instance zero-knowledge proofs (and some weaker versions),
as initiated by Feige, Fiat and Shamir [FS86, FFS87], allow for secure identification. In a more
sophisticated model, where we allow the common key w to be of low entropy and additionally
consider a man-in-the-middle attack, we can use techniques from password-based key-agreement
⋆ A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2007 [DFSS07].
⋆⋆ Supported by the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ supported by EU fifth framework project QAP IST 015848 and the NWO VICI project 2004-2009.
(like [KOY01, GL03]) to obtain secure identification schemes. Common to these approaches is that
security relies on the assumption that some computational problem (like factoring or computing
discrete logs) is hard and that the attacker has limited computing power.
Our Contribution. In this work, we take a new approach: we consider quantum communication,
and we develop two identification schemes which are information-theoretically secure under the sole
assumption that the attacker can only reliably store quantum states of limited size. This model
was first considered in [DFSS05]. On the other hand, the honest participants only need to send
qubits and measure them immediately upon arrival, no quantum storage or quantum computation
is required. Furthermore, our identification schemes are robust to both noisy quantum channels and
imperfect quantum sources. Our schemes can therefore be implemented in practice using existing
technology.
The first scheme is secure against dishonest users and servers but not against a man-in-the-
middle attack. It allows the common secret-key w to be non-uniform and of low entropy, like a
human-memorizable password. Only a user knowing w can succeed in convincing the server. In any
execution of this scheme, a dishonest user or server cannot learn more on w than excluding one
possibility, which is unavoidable. This is sometimes referred to as password-based identification. The
second scheme requires in addition to w a uniformly distributed high-entropy common secret-key
k, but is additionally secure against a man-in-the-middle attack. Furthermore, security against a
dishonest user or server holds as for the first scheme even if the dishonest party knows k (but
not w). This implies that k can for instance be stored on a smart card, and security of the scheme
is still guaranteed even if the smart card gets stolen, assuming that the affected party notices the
theft and thus does not engage in the scheme anymore. Both schemes compose sequentially, and w
(and k) may be safely re-used super-polynomially many times, even if the identification fails (due
to an attack, or due to a technical failure).
A small modification of the second identification scheme results in a quantum-key-distribution
(QKD) scheme secure against bounded-quantum-memory adversaries. The advantage of the pro-
posed new QKD scheme is that no authenticated channel is needed and the attacker can not force
the parties to run out of authentication keys. The honest parties merely need to share a password
w and a high-entropy secret-key k, which they can safely re-use (super-polynomially many times),
independent of whether QKD succeeds or fails. Furthermore, like for the identification scheme,
losing k does not compromise security as long as the loss is noticed by the corresponding party.
One may think of this as a quantum version of password-based authenticated key exchange. The
properties of our solution are in sharp contrast to all known QKD schemes without authenticated
channels (which do not pose any restrictions on the attacker). In these schemes, an attacker can
force parties to run out of authentication keys by making the QKD execution fail (e.g. by blocking
some messages). Worse, even if the QKD execution fails only due to technical problems, the parties
can still run out of authentication keys after a short while, since they cannot exclude that an eaves-
dropper was in fact present. This problem is an important drawback of QKD implementations,
especially of those susceptible to single (or few) point(s) of failure [EPT03].
Other Approaches. We briefly discuss how our identification schemes compare with other
approaches. We have already given some indication on how to construct computationally secure
identification schemes. This approach typically allows for very practical schemes, but requires
some unproven complexity assumption. Another interesting difference between the two approaches:
whereas for (known) computationally-secure password-based identification schemes the underlying
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computational hardness assumption needs to hold indefinitely, the restriction on the attacker’s
quantum memory in our approach only needs to hold during the execution of the identification
scheme, actually only at one single point during the execution. In other words, having a super-
quantum-storage-device at home in the basement only helps you cheat at the ATM if you can
communicate with it on-line quantumly – in contrast to a computational solution, where an off-line
super-computer in the basement can make a crucial difference.
Furthermore, obtaining a satisfactory identification scheme requires some restriction on the
adversary, even in the quantum setting: considering only passive attacks, Lo [Lo97] showed that for
an unrestricted adversary, no password-based quantum identification scheme exists. In fact, Lo’s
impossibility result only applies if the user U is guaranteed not to learn anything about the outcome
of the identification procedure. We can argue, however, that a different impossibility result holds
even without Lo’s restriction: We first show that secure computation of a classical and gate (in
which both players learn the output) can be reduced to a password-based identification scheme.
The reduction works as follows. Let w0, w
′
0 and w1 be three distinct elements from W. If Alice has
private input xA = 0 then she sets wA = w0 and if xA = 1 then she sets wA = w1, and if Bob
has private input xB = 0 then he sets wB = w
′
0 and if xB = 1 then he sets wB = w1. Then, Alice
and Bob run the identification scheme on inputs wA and wB , and if the identification is rejected,
the output is set to 0 while if it is accepted, the output is set to 1. Security of the identification
scheme is easily seen to imply security of the and computation. Now, the secure computation of an
and gate—with statistical security and using quantum communication—can be shown to require
a superpolynomial number of rounds if the adversary is unbounded [NPS07]. Therefore, the same
must hold for a secure password-based identification scheme.1. In fact, in very recent work [BCS09],
using the definitions from [FS09], it is shown that the whole password of the honest player leaks to
the dishonest player.
Another alternative approach is the classical bounded-storage model [Mau90, CCM98, ADR02].
In contrast to our approach, only classical communication is used, and it is assumed that the
attacker’s classical memory is bounded. Unlike in the quantum case where we do not need to
require the honest players to have any quantum memory, the classical bounded-storage model
requires honest parties to have a certain amount of memory which is related to the allowed memory
size of the adversary: if two legitimate users need n bits of memory in an identification protocol
meeting our security criterion, then an adversary must be bounded in memory to O(n2) bits. The
reason is that given a secure password-based identification scheme, one can construct (in a black-
box manner) a key-distribution scheme that produces a one-bit key on which the adversary has an
(average) entropy of 12 . On the other hand it is known that in any key-distribution scheme which
requires n bits of memory for legitimate players, an adversary with memory Ω(n2) can obtain the
key except for an arbitrarily small amount of remaining entropy [DM04]. It follows that password-
based identification schemes in the classical bounded-storage model can only be secure against
adversaries with memory at most O(n2). This holds even for identification schemes with only
passive security and without security against man-in-the-middle attacks. Roughly, the reduction
works as follows. Alice and Bob agree on a public set of two keys {w0, w1}. Alice picks a ∈R {0, 1},
Bob picks b ∈R {0, 1}, and they run the identification scheme with keys wa and wb respectively.
1 In fact, we believe that the proof from [NPS07] can be extended to cover secure computation of equality of strings,
which is equivalent to password-based identification. This would mean that we could prove the impossibility result
directly, without the detour via a secure AND computation.
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The outcome of the identification is then made public from which Bob determines a. We argue that
if the identification fails, i.e. a 6= b, then a is a secure bit. Thus, on average, a has entropy (close to)
1
2 from an eavesdropper’s point of view. Consider w
′ 6∈ {w0, w1}. By the security property of the
identification scheme, Alice and thus also a passive eavesdropper Eve cannot distinguish between
Bob having used wb or w
′. Similarly, we can then switch Alice’s key wa to w1−a and Bob’s switched
key w′ to w1−b without changing Eve’s view. Thus, Eve cannot distinguish an execution with a = 0
from one with a = 1 if a 6= b.
This limitation of the classical bounded-storage model is in sharp contrast with what we achieve
in this paper, the honest players need no quantum memory at all while our identification scheme
remains secure against adversaries with quantum memory linear in the total number of qubits sent.
The same separation between the two models was shown for OT and bit commitment [DFSS05,
DFR+07].
Finally, if one settles for the bounded-quantum-storage model, then in principle one could take a
generic construction for general two-party secure-function-evaluation (SFE) based on OT together
with the OT scheme from [DFSS05, DFR+07] in order to implement a SFE for string equality and
thus password-based identification. However, this approach leads to a highly impractical solution, as
the generic construction requires many executions of OT, whereas our solution is comparable with
one execution of the OT scheme from [DFSS05, DFR+07]. Furthermore, SFE does not automatically
take care of a man-in-the-middle attack, thus additional work would need to be done using this
approach.
Subsequent Work. The difficulty of storing quantum information can also be modeled differently
from assuming a bound on the physical number of qubits an adversary can control. In the more
realistic noisy-quantum-storage model put forward in [WST08], all incoming qubits can be stored
by an adversary but are subject to storage noise. Assuming a simple storage strategy, one can show
that the protocols in the current paper remain secure [STW08], whereas it is unknown if security
still holds in case of more sophisticated storage strategies [KWW09].
If the storage limitation on the adversary fails to hold, it is easy to see that not only will our
security proofs fail, but in fact the protocol we propose can be broken quite efficiently. However, it
was recently shown, in [DFL+09], how to add a “preamble” to the protocol using a commitment
scheme based on a computational assumption. It is shown in [DFL+09] that to break the resulting
protocol, an adversary must have both large quantum memory and large computing power.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and Terminology
Quantum States. We assume the reader’s familiarity with basic notation and concepts of quan-
tum information processing [NC00]. In this paper, the computational or + -basis is defined by the
pair {|0〉, |1〉} (also written as {|0〉+, |1〉+}). The pair {|0〉×, |1〉×} denotes the diagonal or ×-basis,
where |0〉× = (|0〉+ |1〉)/
√
2 and |1〉× = (|0〉− |1〉)/
√
2. We write |x〉θ = |x1〉θ1 ⊗ · · ·⊗ |xn〉θn for the
n-qubit state where string x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n is encoded in bases θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ {+,×}n.
The behavior of a (mixed) quantum state in a register E is fully described by its density
matrix ρE . In order to simplify language, we tend to be a bit sloppy and use E as well as ρE as
“naming” for the quantum state. We often consider cases where a quantum state E may depend on
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some classical random variable X (from a finite set X ) in that the state is described by the density
matrix ρxE if and only if X = x. For an observer who has only access to the state E but not to X,
the behavior of the state is determined by the density matrix ρE :=
∑
x PX(x)ρ
x
E , whereas the joint
state, consisting of the classical X and the quantum state E, is described by the density matrix
ρXE :=
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE, where we understand {|x〉}x∈X to be the standard (orthonormal)
basis of C|X |. More general, for any event E (defined by PE|X(x) = P [E|X=x] for all x), we write
ρXE|E :=
∑
x
PX|E(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE and ρE|E := trX(ρXE|E) =
∑
x
PX|E(x)ρ
x
E . (1)
We also write ρX :=
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| for the quantum representation of the classical random variable
X (and similarly for ρX|E). This notation extends naturally to quantum states that depend on
several classical random variables, defining the density matrices ρXY E , ρXY E|E , ρY E|X=x etc. We
tend to slightly abuse notation and write ρxY E = ρY E|X=x and ρ
x
Y E|E = ρY E|X=x,E , as well as ρ
x
E =
trY (ρ
x
Y E) and ρ
x
E|E = trY (ρ
x
Y E|E).
2 Note that writing ρXE = trY (ρXY E) and ρE = trX,Y (ρXY E) is
consistent with the above notation. We also write ρXE|E = trY (ρXY E|E) and ρE|E = trX,Y (ρXY E|E),
where one has to be aware that in contrast to (1), here the state E may depend on the event E
(namely via Y ), so that, e.g., ρE|E =
∑
x PX|E(x)ρ
x
E|E . Given a quantum state E that depends on
a classical random variable X, by saying that there exists a random variable Y such that ρXYE
satisfies some condition, we mean that ρXE can be understood as ρXE = trY (ρXY E) for some ρXYE
(with classical Y ) and that ρXY E satisfies the required condition.
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X is independent of E (in that ρxE does not depend on x) if and only if ρXE = ρX ⊗ ρE , which
in particular implies that no information on X can be learned by observing only E. Similarly, X is
random and independent of E if and only if ρXE =
1
|X |I⊗ ρE , where 1|X |I is the density matrix of
the fully mixed state of suitable dimension. Finally, if two states like ρXE and ρX ⊗ ρE are ε-close
in terms of their trace distance δ(ρ, σ) = 12 tr(|ρ − σ|), which we write as ρXE ≈ε ρX ⊗ ρE , then
the real system ρXE “behaves” as the ideal system ρX ⊗ ρE except with probability ε in that for
any evolution of the system no observer can distinguish the real from the ideal one with advantage
greater than ε [RK05]. As ε can be interpreted as an error probability, we typically require ε to
be negligible in a security parameter n, denoted as ε = negl(n). A security parameter is a natural
number n given as input to all players in our protocols, and a probability is said to be negligible in
n if for any polynomial p, it is smaller than 1/p(n) for all sufficiently large n.
Conditional Independence. We also need to express that a random variable X is (close to)
independent of a quantum state E when given a random variable Y . This means that when given Y ,
the state E gives no (or little) additional information on X. Formally, this is expressed by requiring
that ρXY E equals (or is close to) ρX↔Y↔E, which is defined as
4
ρX↔Y↔E :=
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyE .
2 The density matrix ρxE|E describes the quantum state E in the case that the event E occurs and X takes on the
value x. The corresponding holds for the other density matrices considered here.
3 This is similar to the case of distributions of classical random variables where given X the existence of a certain
Y is understood that there exists a certain joint distribution PXY with
P
y
PXY (·, y) = PX .
4 The notation is inspired by the classical setting where the corresponding independence of X and Z given Y can
be expressed by saying that X ↔ Y ↔ Z forms a Markov chain.
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In other words, ρXY E = ρX↔Y↔E precisely if ρ
x,y
E = ρ
y
E for all x and y. To further illustrate its
meaning, notice that if the Y -register is measured and value y is obtained, then the state ρX↔Y↔E
collapses to (
∑
x PX|Y (x|y)|x〉〈x|)⊗ ρyE, so that indeed no further information on x can be obtained
from the E-register. This notation naturally extends to ρX↔Y↔E|E simply by considering ρXY E|E
instead of ρXY E . Explicitly, ρX↔Y↔E|E =
∑
x,y PXY |E(x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyE|E .
The notion of conditional independence has been introduced in [DFSS07] (a classical version
was independently proposed in [CW08]) and used as a convenient tool in subsequent papers [FS09,
BCS09]. In this paper we will use the following property of conditional independence whose proof
is given in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2.1. For any event E, the density matrix ρX↔Y↔E can be decomposed into
ρX↔Y↔E = P [E ]2 · ρX↔Y↔E|E + (1− P [E ]2) · τ
for some density matrix τ . Furthermore, if E is independent of X and Y , then
ρX↔Y↔E = P [E ] · ρX↔Y↔E|E + P [E¯ ] · ρX↔Y↔E|E¯ .
(Conditional) Smooth Min-Entropy. Different notions of conditional (smooth) min-entropy
have been proposed in the literature; we briefly specify here the variant that is convenient for us.
Let X and Y be random variables, over respective finite alphabets X and Y, with joint distribution
PXY . The conditional min-entropy of X given Y is defined as the negative logarithm of the guessing
probability of X given Y : Hmin(X|Y ) := − log
(
pguess(X|Y )
)
where
pguess(X|Y ) :=
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PX|Y (x|y) =
∑
y
max
x
PXY (x, y)
and log denotes the binary logarithm (here and throughout the paper). More generally, we define
Hmin(XE|Y ) for any event E as Hmin(XE|Y ) := − log
(
pguess(XE|Y )
)
where5
pguess(XE|Y ) :=
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PXE|Y (x|y) =
∑
y
max
x
PXY E(x, y) .
The conditional smooth min-entropy Hεmin(X|Y ) is then defined as
Hεmin(X|Y ) := max
E
Hmin(XE|Y )
where the max is over all events E with P [E ] ≥ 1− ε.
Obviously, the unconditional versions of smooth and non-smooth min-entropy are obtained
by using an “empty” Y ; furthermore the above notions extend naturally to Hmin(X|Y, E) and
Hεmin(X|Y, E) for any event E by considering the corresponding conditional joint distribution PXY |E .
5 pguess(XE|Y ) can be understood as the optimal probability in guessing X and have E occur, when given Y .
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2.2 Tools
Min-Entropy-Splitting . A technical tool, which will come in handy, is the following entropy-
splitting lemma, which may also be of independent interest. Informally, it says that if for a list
of random variables, every pair has high (smooth) min-entropy, then all of the random variables
except one must have high (smooth) min-entropy. The proof is given in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 2.2 (Entropy-Splitting Lemma). Let ε ≥ 0. Let X1, . . . ,Xm and Z be random vari-
ables such that Hεmin(XiXj |Z) ≥ α for all i 6= j. Then there exists a random variable V over
{1, . . . ,m} such that for any independent random variable W over {1, . . . ,m} with Hmin(W ) ≥ 1,
H2mεmin (XW |VWZ, V 6=W ) ≥ α/2− log(m)− 1 .
Quantum Uncertainty Relation. At the very core of our security proofs lies (a special case of)
the quantum uncertainty relation from [DFR+07]6, that lower bounds the (smooth) min-entropy
of the outcome when measuring an arbitrary n-qubit state in a random basis θ ∈ {0, 1}n.
Theorem 2.3 (Uncertainty Relation [DFR+07]). Let E be an arbitrary fixed n-qubit state.
Let Θ be uniformly distributed over {+,×}n (independent of E), and let X ∈ {0, 1}n be the random
variable for the outcome of measuring E in basis Θ. Then, for any λ > 0, the conditional smooth
min-entropy is lower bounded by
Hεmin(X|Θ) ≥
(1
2
− 2λ
)
n
with ε ≤ 2−σ(λ)n and σ(λ) = λ2 log(e)
32(2−log(λ))2
.
Thus, ignoring negligibly small “error probabilities” and linear fractions that can be chosen ar-
bitrarily small, the outcome of measuring any n-qubit state in a random basis has n/2 bits of
min-entropy, given the basis.
Privacy Amplification. Finally, we recall the quantum-privacy-amplification theorem of Renner
and Ko¨nig [RK05]. The version we use here follows immediately from [Ren05, Corollary 5.6.1] by
applying the chain rule for min- and max-entropy [Ren05, Lemma 3.2.9] and using the equivalence,
as shown in [KRS08], of the quantum and the classical notion of (smooth) conditional min-entropy.
Recall that a class F of hash functions from X to Y is called (strongly) universal-2 if for any
x 6= x′ ∈ X , and for F uniformly distributed over F , the collision probability P [F (x) = F (x′)] is
upper bounded by 1/|Y|, respectively, for the strong notion, the random variables F (x) and F (x′)
are uniformly and independently distributed over Y.
Theorem 2.4. Let X and Z be random variables distributed over X and Z, respectively, and let
E be a q-qubit state that may depend on X and Z. Let F be the random and independent choice of
a member of a universal-2 class of hash functions F from X into {0, 1}ℓ. Then, for any ε > 0
δ
(
ρF (X)FZE ,
1
2ℓ
I⊗ ρFZE
) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
(
Hε
min
(X|Z)−q−ℓ
)
+ 2ε .
6 In [DFR+07], a stricter notion of conditional smooth min-entropy was used, which in particular implies the bound
as stated here.
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3 The Identification Scheme
3.1 The Setting
We assume that the honest user U and the honest server S share some key w ∈ W (which we think
of as a password), where the choice of w is described by the random variable W . An identification
protocol is now simply any protocol for U and S using classical and/or quantum communication
where the parties are both given as input a security parameter n and (in the honest case) the
password w, and where S outputs accept or reject in the end.
We do not require W to be very large (i.e. |W| does not have to be lower bounded by the
security parameter in any way), and w does not necessarily have to be uniformly distributed in W.
So, we may think of w as a human-memorizable password or PIN code. The goal of this section is to
construct an identification scheme that allows U to “prove” to S that he knows w. The scheme should
have the following security properties: a dishonest server S∗ learns essentially no information on w
beyond that he can come up with a guess w′ for w and learns whether w′ = w or not, and similarly
a dishonest user succeeds in convincing the verifier essentially only if he guesses w correctly, and if
his guess is incorrect then the only thing he learns is that his guess is incorrect. This in particular
implies that as long as the entropy of W is large enough, the identification scheme may be safely
repeated. Finally, it must of course be the case that S accepts the legitimate user who has the
correct password. More formally, we require the following:
Definition 3.1. An execution by honest U,S on input w for both parties results in S accepting,
except with negligible probability (as a function of n).
Definition 3.2. We say that an identification protocol for two parties U,S is secure for the user
with error ε against (dishonest) server S∗ if the following is satisfied: whenever the initial state of
S∗ is independent of W , the joint state ρWES∗ after the execution of the protocol is such that there
exists a random variable W ′ that is independent of W and such that
ρWW ′ES∗ |W ′ 6=W ≈ε ρW↔W ′↔ES∗ |W ′ 6=W .
Definition 3.3. We say that an identification protocol for two parties U,S is secure for the server
with error ε against (dishonest) user U∗ if the following is satisfied: whenever the initial state of
a dishonest user U∗ is independent of W , there exists W ′ (possibly ⊥), independent of W , such
that if W 6= W ′ then S accepts with probability at most ε, and if W = W ′ then S accepts with
certainty. Furthermore, the common state ρWEU∗ after the execution of the protocol (including S’s
announcement to accept or reject) satisfies
ρWW ′EU∗ |W ′ 6=W ≈ε ρW↔W ′↔EU∗ |W ′ 6=W .
If these definitions are satisfied for a small ε, we are guaranteed that whatever a dishonest
party does is essentially as good as trying to guess W by some arbitrary (but independent) W ′
and learning whether the guess was correct or not, but nothing beyond that. Such a property is
obviously the best one can hope for, since an attacker may always honestly execute the protocol
with a guess for W and observe whether the protocol was successful.
We would like to point out that the above security definitions, and in fact any security claim in
this paper, guarantees sequential self-composability, as the output state is guaranteed to have the
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same independency property (for any fixed choice ofW ′) as is required from the input state (except
if the attacker guesses W ). Moreover, it is shown in [FS08a, FS09] that our definitions imply a
“real/ideal” world definition given in [FS09]. More specifically, it is shown that a protocol satisfying
our information theoretic conditions implements a natural ideal identification functionality, and by
the composition theorem from [FS09], this means that the protocol composes sequentially in a
classical environment, i.e. the quantum protocol can be treated as the ideal functionality when
analyzing a more complicated classical outer protocol.
It should be noted that security for user and server is usually not sufficient for application in
practice of an identification protocol. A problem occurs if the honest user and server are interacting
and an attacker can manipulate the communication, i.e., do a “man-in-the-middle” attack, and
observe the reaction of the honest parties. This scenario is not covered by the above definitions,
and indeed it turns out that the simplest version of our protocol is not secure against such an
attack. Nevertheless, the problem can be solved and we address it in Section 4.
3.2 The Intuition
The scheme we propose is related to the (randomized) 1-2 OT scheme of [DFR+07]. In that scheme,
Alice sends |x〉θ to Bob, for random x ∈ {0, 1}n and θ ∈ {+,×}n. Bob then measures everything
in basis + or ×, depending on his choice bit c, so that he essentially knows half of x (where Alice
used the same basis as Bob) and has no information on the other half (where Alice used the other
basis), though, at this point, he does not know yet which bits he knows and which ones he does
not. Then, Alice sends θ and two hash functions to Bob, and outputs the hash values s0 and s1
of the two parts of x, whereas Bob outputs the hash value sc that he is able to compute from
the part of x he knows. It is proven in [DFR+07] that no dishonest Alice can learn c, and for any
quantum-memory-bounded dishonest Bob, at least one of the two strings s0 and s1 is random for
Bob.
This scheme can be extended by giving Bob more options for measuring the quantum state.
Instead of measuring all qubits in the + or the × basis, he may measure using m different strings
of bases, where any two possible basis-strings have large Hamming distance. Then Alice computes
and outputs m hash values, one for each possible basis-string that Bob might have used. She reveals
θ and the hash functions to Bob, so he can compute the hash value corresponding to the basis that
he has used, and no other hash value. Intuitively, such an extended scheme leads to a randomized
1-m OT.
The scheme can now be transformed into a secure identification scheme as follows, where we
assume (wlog) that W = {1, . . . ,m}. The user U, acting as Alice, and the server S, acting as Bob,
execute the randomized 1-m OT scheme where S “asks” for the string indexed by his key w, such
that U obtains random strings s1, . . . , sm and S obtains sw. Then, to do the actual identification,
U sends sw to S, who accepts if and only if it coincides with his string sw. Intuitively, such a
construction is secure against a dishonest server since unless he asks for the right string (by guessing
w correctly) the string U sends him is random and thus gives no information on w. On the other
hand, a dishonest user does not know which of the m strings S asked for and wants to see from
him. We realize this intuitive idea in the next section. In the actual protocol, U does not have to
explicitly compute all the si’s, and also we only need a single hash function (to compute sw). We
also take care of some subtleties, for instance that the si are not necessarily random if Alice (i.e.
the user) is dishonest.
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3.3 The Basic Scheme
Let c :W → {+,×}n be the encoding function of a binary code of length n withm = |W| codewords
and minimal distance d. c can be chosen such that n is linear in log(m) or larger, and d is linear in n.
Furthermore, let F and G be strongly universal-2 classes of hash functions7 from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ
and from W to {0, 1}ℓ, respectively, for some parameter ℓ. For x ∈ {0, 1}n and I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we
define x|I ∈ {0, 1}n to be the restriction of x to the coordinates xi with i ∈ I. If |I| < n then
applying f ∈ F to x|I is to be understood as applying f to x|I padded with sufficiently many 0’s.
Q-ID:
1. U picks x ∈R {0, 1}
n and θ ∈R {+,×}
n, and sends state |x〉
θ
to S.
2. S measures |x〉
θ
in basis c = c(w). Let x′ be the outcome.
3. U picks f ∈R F and sends θ and f to S. Both compute Iw := {i : θi= c(w)i}.
4. S picks g ∈R G and sends g to U.
5. U computes and sends z := f(x|Iw )⊕ g(w) to S.
6. S accepts if and only if z = z′ where z′ := f(x′|Iw )⊕ g(w).
It is trivial that the protocol satisfies Definition 3.1. In addition, we have:
Proposition 3.4 (User security). Assume that the size of the quantum memory of dishonest
server S∗ is at most q at step 3 of Q-ID, and that Hmin(W ) ≥ 1. Then Q-ID is secure for the user
with error ε against S∗ according to Definition 3.2, where
ε = 2−
1
2
(( 1
4
−λ)d−log(m)−q−ℓ−1) + 2−(σ(λ)d−log(m)−3)
for an arbitrary 0 < λ < 14 .
Note that σ(λ) was defined earlier in the claim of the uncertainty relation. To understand what the
result on εmeans, note that using a family of asymptotically good codes, we can assume that d grows
linearly with the main security parameter n, while still allowing m (the number of passwords) to be
exponential in n. So we may choose the parameters such that dn ,
log(m)
n ,
q
n and
ℓ
n are all constants.
The result above now says that ε is exponentially small as a function of n if these constants are
chosen in such a way that for some 0 < λ < 14 , it holds that (
1
4 − λ) dn − log(m)n − qn − ℓn > 0 and
σ(λ) dn − log(m)n > 0. See Theorem 3.6 for a choice of parameters that also take server security into
account. If we are willing to assume that log(m) is sublinear in n, which may be quite reasonable
is case we use short passwords that humans can remember, the condition further simplifies to
d
4n − qn − ℓn > 0.
Proof. We consider and analyze a purified version of Q-ID where in step 1, instead of sending |x〉θ
to S∗ for a random x, U prepares a fully entangled state 2−n/2
∑
x |x〉|x〉 and sends the second
register to S∗ while keeping the first. Then, in step 3 when the memory bound has applied, he
measures his register in the random basis θ ∈R {+,×}n in order to obtain x. Standard arguments
imply that this purified version produces exactly the same common state, consisting of the classical
information on U’s side and S∗’s quantum state.
7 Actually, we only need G to be strongly universal-2.
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Recall that before step 3 is executed, the memory bound applies to S∗, meaning that S∗ has to
measure all but q of the qubits he holds, which consists of his initial state and his part of the EPR
pairs. Before doing the measurement, he may append an ancilla register and apply an arbitrary
unitary transform. As a result of S∗’s measurement, S∗ gets some outcome y, and the common state
collapses to a (n+ q)-qubit state (which depends on y), where the first n qubits are with U and the
remaining q with S∗. The following analysis is for a fixed y, and works no matter what y is.
We use upper case letters W , X, Θ, F , G and Z for the random variables that describe the
respective values w, x, θ etc. in an execution of the purified version of Q-ID. We write Xj = X|Ij
for any j, and we let E′
S∗
be S∗’s q-qubit state at step 3, after the memory bound has applied. Note
that W is independent of X, Θ, F , G and E′
S∗
.
For 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m, fix the value of X, and correspondingly of Xi and Xj , at the positions
where c(i) and c(j) coincide, and focus on the remaining (at least) d positions. The uncertainty
relation (Theorem 2.3) implies that the restriction of X to these positions has (12 − 2λ)d bits
of ε′-smooth min-entropy given Θ, where ε′ ≤ 2−σ(λ)d and 0 < λ < 12 arbitrary. Since every
bit in the restricted X appears in one of Xi and Xj , the pair Xi,Xj also has (
1
2 − 2λ)d bits of
ε′-smooth min-entropy given Θ. The Entropy Splitting Lemma 2.2 implies that there exists W ′
(called V in Lemma 2.2) such that if W 6= W ′ then XW has (14 − λ)d − log(m) − 1 bits of 2mε′-
smooth min-entropy given W and W ′ (and Θ). Privacy amplification then guarantees that F (XW )
is ε′′-close to random and independent of F,W,W ′, Θ and E′
S∗
, conditioned on W 6= W ′, where
ε′′ = 12 · 2−
1
2
(d/4−λd−log(m)−1−q−ℓ) + 4mε′. It follows that Z = F (XW )⊕G(W ) is ε′′-close to random
and independent of F,G,W,W ′, Θ and E′
S∗
, conditioned on W 6=W ′.
Formally, we want to upper bound δ(ρWW ′ES∗ |W ′ 6=W , ρW↔W ′↔ES∗ |W ′ 6=W ). Since the output state
ES∗ is, without loss of generality, obtained by applying some unitary transform to the set of registers
(Z,F,G,W ′, Θ,E′
S∗
), the distance above is equal to the distance between ρWW ′(Z,F,G,Θ,E′
S∗
)|W ′ 6=W
and ρW↔W ′↔(Z,F,G,Θ,E′
S∗
)|W ′ 6=W . We then get:
ρWW ′(Z,F,G,Θ,E′
S∗
)|W ′ 6=W ≈ε′′ 12ℓ I⊗ ρWW ′(F,G,Θ,E′S∗)|W ′ 6=W
= 1
2ℓ
I⊗ ρW↔W ′↔(F,G,Θ,E′
S∗
)|W ′ 6=W ≈ε′′ ρW↔W ′↔(Z,F,G,Θ,E′
S∗
)|W ′ 6=W ,
where approximations follow from privacy amplification and the exact equality comes from the
independency of W , which, when conditioned on W ′ 6= W , translates to independency given W ′.
The claim follows with ε = 2ε′′. ⊓⊔
Proposition 3.5 (Server security). If Hmin(W ) ≥ 1, then Q-ID is secure for the server with
error ε against any U∗ according to Definition 3.3, where ε = m2/2ℓ.
The formal proof is given below. The idea is the following. We let U∗ execute Q-ID with a server
that is unbounded in quantum memory. Such a server can obviously obtain x and thus compute
sj = f(x|Ij) ⊕ g(j) for all j. Note that sw is the message z that U∗ is required to send in the
last step. Now, if the sj’s are all distinct, then z uniquely defines w
′ such that z = sw′, and thus
S accepts if and only if w′ = w, and U∗ does not learn anything beyond. The strong universal-2
property of g guarantees that the sj ’s are all distinct except with probability m
2/2ℓ.
Proof. Again, we consider a slightly modified version. We let U∗ interact with a server that has
unbounded quantum memory and does the following. Instead of measuring |x〉θ in step 2 in basis
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c, it stores the state and measures it after step 3 in basis θ (and obtains x). This modified version
produces the same common state ρWEU∗ as the original scheme, since the only difference between
the two is when and in what basis the qubits at positions i 6∈ Iw are measured, which does not
effect the execution in any way.
We use the upper case letters W , X, Θ, F , G and Z for the random variables that describe
the respective values w, x, θ etc. in an execution of the modified version of Q-ID. Furthermore, we
define Sj := F (X|Ij ) ⊕ G(j) for j = 1, . . . ,m. Note that Z ′ = SW represents the value z′ used by
S in the last step. Let E be the event that all Sj’s are distinct. By the strong universal-2 property,
and since G is independent of X and F , the Sj’s are pairwise independent and thus it follows from
the union bound that E occurs except with probability at most m(m− 1)/2 · 1/2ℓ ≤ m2/2ℓ+1.
Let E′
U∗
be U∗’s quantum state after the execution of Q-ID but before he learns S’s decision to
accept or reject. We may assume that the values of all random variables X, Θ, F , G, Z and the
Sj’s are known/given to U
∗, i.e., we consider them as part of E′
U∗
. Furthermore, we may assume
that Z is one of the Sj ’s, i.e. that Z = SW ′ for a random variable W
′. Indeed, if Z 6= Sj for all j
then we set W ′ :=⊥ and S’s decision is “reject”, no matter what W is, and U∗ obviously learns no
information on W at all. By the way we have defined W ′, is clear that S accepts if W =W ′.
Note that E′
U∗
is independent of W by assumption on U∗’s initial state (in Definition 3.3) and
by definition of the random variables X, Θ etc. Since E is determined by the Sj ’s (which are part
of E′
U∗
), this holds also when conditioning on E . This then translates to the independence of E′
U∗
from W when given W ′, conditioned on W ′ 6=W and E .
We now consider U∗’s state EU∗ after he has learned S’s decision. If W
′ 6= W and all Sj’s are
distinct then S rejects with probability 1. Hence, conditioned on the events W ′ 6= W and E , U∗’s
state EU∗ remains independent of W given W
′. Define p := P [E|W ′ 6=W ] and p¯ := P [E¯ |W ′ 6=W ]
= 1 − p, where E¯ is the complementary event to E . Recall that P [E¯ ] ≤ m2/2ℓ+1, and therefore
p¯ ≤ P [E¯ ]/(1 − P [W ′ =W ]) ≤ 2P [E¯ ] ≤ m2/2ℓ, where the second-last inequality follows from the
independence of W and W ′, and from the condition on Hmin(W ). Note that p¯ upper bounds the
probability that S accepts in case W ′ 6=W , proving the first claim. From the above it follows that
ρWW ′EU∗ |W ′ 6=W = p · ρWW ′EU∗ |E,W ′ 6=W + p¯ · ρWW ′EU∗ |E¯,W ′ 6=W
= p · ρW↔W ′↔EU∗ |E,W ′ 6=W + p¯ · ρWW ′EU∗ |E¯,W ′ 6=W .
Furthermore, it is not too hard to see that E is independent of W and W ′, and thus also when
conditioned on W ′ 6=W . Lemma 2.1 hence implies that
ρW↔W ′↔EU∗ |W ′ 6=W = p · ρW↔W ′↔EU∗ |E,W ′ 6=W + p¯ · ρW↔W ′↔EU∗ |E¯,W ′ 6=W .
By definition of the metric δ(·, ·), and because it cannot be bigger than 1, the distance between the
two states is at most p¯ ≤ m2/2ℓ. ⊓⊔
We call an identification scheme ε-secure against impersonation attacks if the protocol is secure
for the user and secure for the sender with error at most ε in both cases. The following holds:
Theorem 3.6. If Hmin(W ) ≥ 1, then the identification scheme Q-ID (with suitable choice of pa-
rameters) is ε-secure against impersonation attacks for any unbounded user and for any server with
quantum memory bound q, where
ε = 2−
1
3
(( 1
4
−λ)nµ−3 log(m)−q−2) + 2−(σ(λ)nµ−log(m)−4)
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for an arbitrary 0 < λ < 14 , and where µ = h
−1(1 − log(m)/n), and h−1 is the inverse function of
the binary entropy function: h(p) := −p · log(p) − (1 − p) · log(1 − p) restricted to 0 < p ≤ 12 . In
particular, if log(m) is sublinear in n, then ε is negligible in n− 8q.
Proof. We choose ℓ = 13
(
(14 − λ)d + 3 log(m) − q − 1
)
. Then user security holds except with an
error ε = 2−
1
3
(( 1
4
−λ)d−3 log(m)−q−1) + 2−(σ(λ)d−2 ln(m)−3), and server security holds except with an
error m2/2ℓ = 2−
1
3
(( 1
4
−λ)d−3 log(m)−q−1). Using a code c, which asymptotically meets the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound [Tho83], d may be chosen arbitrarily close to n ·h−1(1− log(m)/n). In particular,
we can ensure that d differs from this value by at most 1. Inserting d = n · h−1(1− log(m)/n) − 1
in the expression for user security yields the theorem. ⊓⊔
3.4 Mutual Identification
In order to obtain mutual identification, where also the server identifies himself towards the user,
one could of course simply run Q-ID in both directions: say, first U identifies himself to S, and
then S identifies himself to U (by exchanging their roles in Q-ID). However, this scheme allows the
dishonest server to exclude two possible keys w ∈ W per invocation, and it requires to also assume
the user’s quantum memory to be bounded, and has doubled complexity.
We briefly sketch an approach that circumvents these drawbacks of the trivial solution: In the
original Q-ID scheme, instead of announcing z = f(x|Iw) ⊕ g(w), U announces a noisy version z˜,
obtained from z by flipping each bit of z independently with some small probability; this still allows
S to verify if U knows w by testing if z˜ is “close” to z′, and S has then to prove knowledge of w by
announcing to U the positions where U flipped the bits.
Security against a dishonest user still holds (with a slightly larger error probability) since the
uniformity of the Sj ’s, as defined in the proof, also guarantees that the Sj’s are pair-wise “far
apart” so thatW ′ is still uniquely determined by Z˜. And security against a dishonest server follows
from the fact that if W ′ 6=W then Z is (essentially) uniformly distributed and thus given its noisy
version Z˜ the server can at best guess the positions of the bit-flips, which are independent of W .
3.5 An Error-tolerant Scheme
We now consider an imperfect quantum channel with “error rate” φ. The scheme Q-ID is sensitive
to such errors in that they cause x|Iw and x′|Iw to be different and thus an honest server S is likely
to reject an honest user U. This problem can be overcome by means of error-correcting techniques:
U chooses a linear error-correcting code that allows to correct a φ-fraction of errors, and then in
step 2, in addition to θ and f , U sends a description of the code and the syndrome s of x|Iw to S; this
additional information allows S to recover x|Iw from its noisy version x′|Iw by standard techniques.
However, this technique introduces a new problem: the syndrome s of x|Iw may give information
on w to a dishonest server. Hence, to circumvent this problem, the code chosen by U must have the
additional property that for a dishonest user, who has high min-entropy on x|Iw , the syndrome s
is (close to) independent of w.
This problem has been addressed and solved in the classical setting by Dodis and Smith [DS05],
and subsequently in the quantum setting in [FS08b]. Dodis and Smith present a family of efficiently
decodable linear codes allowing to correct a constant fraction of errors, and where the syndrome
of a string is close to uniform if the string has enough min-entropy and the code is chosen at
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random from the family. Specifically, Lemma 5 of [DS05] guarantees that for every 0 < λ < 1 and
for an infinite number of n′’s there exists a δ-biased (as defined in [DS05]) family C = {Cj}j∈J
of [n′, k′, d′]2-codes with δ < 2
−λn′/2, and which allows to efficiently correct a constant fraction of
errors. Furthermore, Theorem 3.2 of [FS08b] (which generalizes Lemma 4 in [DS05] to the quantum
setting) guarantees that if a string Y has t bits of min-entropy8 then for a randomly chosen code
Cj ∈ C, the syndrome of Y is close to random and independent of j and any q-qubit state that may
depend on Y , where the closeness is given by δ · 2(n′+q−t)/2. In our application, Y = XW , n′ ≈ n/2
and t ≈ d/4 − log(m) − ℓ, where the additional loss of ℓ bits of entropy comes from learning the
ℓ-bit string z. Choosing λ = 1 − t2n′ gives an ensemble of code families that allow to correct a
linear number of errors and the syndrome is ε-close to uniform given the quantum state, where
ε ≤ 2−n′/2+t/4 · 2(n′+q−t)/2 = 2−(t−2q)/4, which is exponentially small provided that there is a linear
gap between t and 2q. Thus, the syndrome gives essentially no additional information. The error
rate φ that can be tolerated this way depends in a rather complicated way on λ, but choosing λ
larger, for instance λ = 1 − t+νq2n′ for a constant ν > 0, allows to tolerate a higher error rate but
requires q to be a smaller (but still constant) fraction of t.
Another imperfection has to be taken into account in current implementations of the quantum
channel: imperfect sources. An imperfect source transmits more than one qubit in the same state
with probability η independently each time a new transmission takes place. To deal with imperfect
sources, we freely give away (xi, θi) to the adversary when a multi-qubit transmission occurs in
position i. It is not difficult to see that parameter ε in Proposition 3.4 then changes in that d is
replaced by (1− η)d.
It follows that a quantum channel with error-rate φ and multi-pulse rate η, called the (φ, η)-weak
quantum model in [DFSS05], can be tolerated for some small enough (but constant) φ and η.
4 Defeating Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
4.1 The Approach
In the previous section, we “only” proved security against impersonation attacks, but we did not
consider a man-in-the-middle attack, where the attacker sits between an honest user and an hon-
est server and controls their (quantum and classical) communication. And indeed, Q-ID is highly
insecure against such an attack: the attacker may measure the first qubit in, say, basis +, and
then forward the collapsed qubit (together with the remaining untouched ones) and observe if S
accepts the session. If not, then the attacker knows that he introduced an error and hence that the
first qubit must have been encoded and measured using the ×-basis, which gives him one bit of
information on the key w. The error-tolerant scheme seems to prevent this particular attack, but
it is by no means clear that it is secure against any man-in-the-middle attack.
To defeat a man-in-the-middle attack that tampers with the quantum communication, we per-
form a check of correctness on a random subset. The check allows to detect if the attacker tampers
too much with the quantum communication, and the scheme can be aborted before sensitive in-
formation is leaked to the attacker. In order to protect the classical communication, one might
use a standard information-theoretic authentication code. However, the key for such a code can
only be securely used a limited number of times. A similar problem occurs in QKD: even though a
8 [FS08b] does not consider smooth min-entropy, but it is not too hard to see that their results also hold for the
smooth version.
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successful QKD execution produces fresh key material that can be used in the next execution, the
attacker can have the parties run out of authentication keys by repeatedly enforcing the executions
to fail. In order to overcome this problem, we will use some special authentication scheme allowing
to re-use the key under certain circumstances, as discussed in Sect. 4.3.
4.2 The Setting
Similar to before, we assume that the user U and the server S share a not necessarily uniform,
low-entropy key w. In order to handle the stronger security requirements of this section, we have
to assume that U and S in addition share a uniform high-entropy key k. We require that a man-in-
the-middle attacker can do no better that making a guess w′ at w, and if his guess is incorrect then
he learns no more information on w besides that his guess is wrong, and essentially no information
on k. More formally:
Definition 4.1. We say that an identification protocol is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks
by E with error ε if, whenever the initial state of E is independent of the keys W and K, there exists
W ′, independent ofW , such that the common state ρKWE after the execution of the protocol satisfies
ρKWW ′E|W ′ 6=W ≈ε ρK ⊗ ρW↔W ′↔E|W ′ 6=W .
Furthermore, we require security against impersonation attacks, as defined in the previous
section, even if the dishonest party knows k. It follows that k can for instance be stored on a smart
card, and security is still guaranteed even if the smart card gets stolen, assuming that the theft
is noticed and the corresponding party does/can not execute the scheme anymore. We would also
like to stress that by our security notion, not only w but also k may be safely reused, even if the
scheme was under attack.
4.3 An Additional Tool: Extractor MACs
An important tool used in this section is an authentication scheme, i.e., a Message Authentication
Code (MAC), that also acts as an extractor, meaning that if there is high min-entropy in the
message, then the key-tag pair cannot be distinguished from the key and a random tag. Such a
MAC, introduced in [DKRS06], is called an extractor MAC, EXTR-MAC for short. For instance
MAC∗α,β(x) = [αx] + β, where α, x ∈ GF (2n), β ∈ GF (2ℓ) and [ . ], denotes truncation to the
ℓ first bits, is an EXTR-MAC: impersonation and substitution probability are 1/2ℓ, and, for an
arbitrary message X and “side information” Z, a random key K = (A,B) and the corresponding
tag T = [A ·X]+B, the tuple (T,K,Z) is (12 · 2−
1
2
(Hε
min
(X|Z)−ℓ) + 2ε
)
-close to (U,K,Z), where U is
the uniform distribution, respectively, ρTKZE is
(
1
2 · 2−
1
2
(Hε
min
(X|Z)−q−ℓ) + 2ε
)
-close to 1
2ℓ
I⊗ρKZE =
1
2ℓ
I⊗ ρK ⊗ ρZE if we allow a q-qubit state E that may depend only on X and Z. A useful feature
of an EXTR-MAC is that if an adversary gets to see the tag of a message on which he has high
min-entropy, then the key for the MAC can be safely re-used (sequentially). Indeed, closeness of
the real state, ρTKE, to the ideal state,
1
2ℓ
I ⊗ ρKE = 12ℓ I ⊗ ρK ⊗ ρE , means that no matter how
the state evolves, the real state behaves like the ideal one (except with small probability), but of
course in the ideal state, K is still “fresh” and can be reused.
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4.4 The Scheme
As for Q-ID, let c :W → {+,×}n be the encoding function of a binary code of length n withm = |W|
codewords and minimal distance d, and for parameter ℓ, let F and G be strongly universal-2 classes
of hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ andW to {0, 1}ℓ, respectively. Also, let MAC∗ : K×M→
{0, 1}ℓ be an EXTR-MAC with an arbitrary key space K, a message space M that will become
clear later, and an error probability 2−ℓ. Furthermore, let {synj}j∈J be the family of syndrome
functions9 corresponding to a family C = {Cj}j∈J of linear error correcting codes of size n′ = n/2,
as discussed in Section 3.5: any Cj allows to efficiently correct a δ-fraction of errors for some
constant δ > 0, and for a random j ∈ J , the syndrome of a string with t = (14 − λ)d− log(m)− 3ℓ
bits of min-entropy is 2−(t−2q)/4-close to uniform (given j and any q-qubit state) for some λ > 0.
Recall, by the set-up assumption, the user U and the server S share a password w ∈ W as well
as a uniform high-entropy key, which we define to be a random authentication key k ∈ K. The
resulting scheme Q-ID+ is given in the box below.
Q-ID+:
1. U picks x ∈R {0, 1}
n and θ ∈R {+,×}
n, and sends the n-qubit state |x〉
θ
to S. Write Iw := {i : θi= c(w)i}.
2. S picks a random subset T ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size ℓ, it computes c = c(w), replaces every ci with i ∈ T by
ci ∈R {+,×} and measures |x〉θ in basis c. Let x
′ be the outcome, and let test′ := x′|T .
3. U sends θ, j ∈R J , s := synj(x|Iw ), and f ∈R F to S.
4. S picks g ∈ G, and sends T and g to U.
5. U sends test := x|T , z := f(x|Iw )⊕ g(w) and tag
∗ := MAC∗k(θ, j, s, f, g, T, test, z, x|Iw ) to S.
6. S recovers x|Iw from x
′|Iw with the help of test and s, and it accepts if and only if (1) tag
∗ verifies correctly,
(2) test coincides with test′ wherever the bases coincide, and (3) z = f(x|Iw )⊕ g(w).
Proposition 4.2 (Security against man-in-the-middle). Assume that the quantum memory
of E is of size at most q qubits at step 3 of Q-ID+. Then Q-ID+ is secure against man-in-the-middle
attacks by E with error ε, where
ε = negl
(
(14 − λ)d− log(m)− 2q − 3ℓ
)
+ negl
(
σ(λ)d − log(m)) + negl(ℓ)
for an arbitrary 0 < λ < 14 .
Proof. We use capital letters (W , Θ, etc.) for the values (w, θ, etc.) occurring in the scheme
whenever we view them as random variables, and we write XW and X
′
W for the random variables
taking values x|Iw and x′|Iw , respectively. To simplify the argument, we neglect error probabilities
that are of order ε, as well as linear fractions that can be chosen arbitrarily small. We merely give
indication of a small error by (sometimes) using the word “essentially”.
First note that due to the security of the MAC and its key, if the attacker substitutes θ, j, s, f, g, T, test
or z, or if S recovers an incorrect string as x|Iw , then S will reject at the end of the protocol.
We can define W ′ (independent of W ) as in the proof of Proposition 3.4 such that if W 6= W ′
9 We agree on the following convention: for a bit string y of arbitrary length, synj(y) is to be understood as
synj(y0 · · · 0) with enough padded zeros if its bit length is smaller than n
′, and as
`
synj(y
′), y′′
´
, where y′ consist
of the first n′ and y′′ of the remaining bits of y, if its bit length is bigger than n′.
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then XW has essentially d/4 − log(m) bits of smooth min-entropy, given W,W ′ and Θ. Further-
more, given TAG∗, F (XW ), TEST (as well as K,F, T,W,W
′ and Θ), XW has still essentially
t = d/4 − log(m) − 3ℓ bits of smooth min-entropy, if W 6= W ′. By the property of the code
family C, it follows that if t > 2q with a linear gap then the syndrome S = synJ(XW ) is essen-
tially random and independent of J, TAG∗, F (XW ), TEST,K,F, T,W,W
′, Θ and E, conditioned
on W 6= W ′. Furthermore, it follows from the privacy-amplifying property of MAC∗ and of f
that if d/4 − log(m) − 2ℓ > q with a linear gap, then the set of values (TAG∗, F (XW )) is es-
sentially random and independent of K,F, TEST, T,W,W ′, Θ and E, conditioned on W 6= W ′.
Finally, K is independent of the rest, and E is independent of K,F, TEST, T,W,Θ. It follows that
ρKWW ′E|W ′ 6=W ≈ ρK ⊗ ρW↔W ′↔E|W ′ 6=W , before he learns S’s decision to accept or reject.
It remains to argue that S’s decision does not give any additional information on W . We will
make a case distinction, which does not depend on w, and we will show for both cases that S’s
decision to accept or reject is independent of w, which proves the claim. But first, we need the
following observation. Recall that outside of the test set T , S measured in the bases dictated by
w, but within T in random bases. Let I ′w be the subset of positions i ∈ Iw with ci = c(w)i (and
thus also = θi), and let T
′ = T ∩ I ′w. In other words, we remove the positions where S measured
in the “wrong” basis. The size of T ′ is essentially ℓ/4, and given its size, it is a random subset of
I ′w of size |T ′|. It follows from the theory of random sampling that ν
(
x|I′w , x′|I′w
)
essentially equals
ν
(
x|T ′ , x′|T ′
)
(except with probability negligible in the size of T ′), where ν(·, ·) denotes the fraction
of errors between the two input strings. Furthermore, since the set V = {i ∈ T : θi = ci} of positions
where U and S compare x and x′ is a superset of T ′ of essentially twice the size, ν
(
x|V , x′|V
)
is
essentially lower bounded by 12 ν
(
x|T ′ , x′|T ′
)
. Putting things together, we get that ν
(
x|I′w , x′|I′w
)
is
essentially upper bounded by 2 ν
(
x|V , x′|V
)
. Also note that ν
(
x|V , x′|V
)
does not depend on w. We
can now do the case distinction: Case 1: If ν
(
x|V , x′|V
) ≤ δ2 (minus an arbitrarily small value),
then x|I′w and x′|I′w differ in at most a δ-fraction of their positions, and thus S correctly recovers x|Iw
(using test = x|T to get x|Iw\I′w and using s to correct the rest), no matter what w is, and it follows
that S’s decision only depends on the attacker’s behavior, but not on w. Case 2: Otherwise, S is
guaranteed to get the correct test = x|T (or else rejects) and thus rejects as test and test′, restricted
to V , differ in more than a δ2 -fraction of their positions. Hence, S always rejects in case 2. ⊓⊔
For a dishonest user or server who knows k (but not w), breaking Q-ID+ is equivalent to breaking
Q-ID, up to a change in the parameters. Doing the maths on the parameters similarly to the proof
of Theorem 3.6 (namely, choosing ℓ = 14
(
(14 − λ)d + log(m) − 2q
)
whence ε = negl
(
(14 − λ)d −
7 log(m)− 2q)), it then follows:
Theorem 4.3. If Hmin(W ) ≥ 1, then the identification scheme Q-ID+ is ε-secure against a man-
in-the-middle attacker with quantum memory bound q, and, even with a leaked k, Q-ID+ is ε-secure
against impersonation attacks for any unbounded user and for any server with quantum memory
bound q, where
ε = negl
(
(14−λ)µn− 7 log(m)− 2q
)
+ negl
(
σ(λ)µn − log(m))
for µ = h−1(1 − log(m)/n) and an arbitrary 0 < λ < 14 . In particular, if log(m) is sublinear in n,
ε is negligible in n− 16q.
It is easy to see that Q-ID+ can tolerate a noisy quantum communication up to any error rate
φ < δ. Similar to the discussion in Section 3.5, tolerating a higher error rate requires the bound on
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the adversary’s quantum memory to be smaller but still linear in the number of qubits transmitted.
Imperfect sources can also be addressed in a similar way as for Q-ID. It follows that Q-ID+ can also
be shown secure in the (φ, η)-weak quantum model provided φ and η are small enough constants.
5 Application to QKD
As already pointed out in Section 4.1, current QKD schemes have the shortcoming that if there is
no classical channel available that is authenticated by physical means, and thus messages need to be
authenticated by an information-theoretic authentication scheme, an attacker can force the parties
to run out of authentication keys simply by making an execution (or several executions if the parties
share more key material) fail. Even worse, even if there is no attacker, but some execution(s) of
the QKD scheme fails due to a technical problem, parties could still run out of authentication keys
because it may not be possible to distinguish between an active attack and a technical failure. This
shortcoming could make the technology impractical in situations where denial of service attacks or
technical interruptions often occur.
The identification scheme Q-ID+ from the previous section immediately gives a QKD scheme in
the bounded-quantum-storage model that allows to re-use the authentications key(s). Actually, we
can inherit the key-setting from Q-ID+, where there are two keys, a human-memorizable password
and a uniform, high-entropy key, where security is still guaranteed even if the latter gets stolen
and the theft is noticed. In order to agree on a secret key sk, the two parties execute Q-ID+, and
extract sk from x|Iw by applying yet another strongly universal-2 function, for instance chosen by
U in step 3 and authenticated together with the other information in Step 5. Here, n needs to be
increased accordingly to have the additional necessary amount of entropy in x|Iw . The analysis of
Q-ID+ immediately implies that if honest S accepts, then he is convinced that he shares sk with
the legitimate U which knows w. In order to convince U, S can then use part of sk to one-time-pad
encrypt w, and send it to U. The rest of sk is then a secure secret key, shared between U and S.
In order to have a better “key rate”, instead of using sk (minus the part used for the one-time-pad
encryption) as secret key, one can also run a standard QKD scheme on top of Q-ID+ and use sk as
a one-time authentication key.
Bibliography
[ADR02] Yonatan Aumann, Yan Zong Ding, and Michael O. Rabin. Everlasting security in the
bounded storage model. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 48(6):1668–1680,
June 2002.
[BCS09] Harry Buhrman, Matthias Christandl, and Christian Schaffner. Impossibility of two-
party secure function evaluation. in preparation, 2009.
[CCM98] C. Cachin, C. Cre´peau, and J. Marcil. Oblivious transfer with a memory-bounded re-
ceiver. In 39th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS),
pages 493–502, 1998.
[CW08] Claude Cre´peau and Ju¨rg Wullschleger. Statistical security conditions for two-party
secure function evaluation. In Third International Conference on Information Theoretic
Security (ICITS), pages 86–99, 2008.
18
[DFL+09] Ivan B. Damg˚ard, Serge Fehr, Carolin Lunemann, Louis Salvail, and Christian Schaffner.
Improving the security of quantum protocols. http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3918,
2009.
[DFR+07] Ivan B. Damg˚ard, Serge Fehr, Renato Renner, Louis Salvail, and Christian Schaffner. A
tight high-order entropic quantum uncertainty relation with applications. In Advances
in Cryptology—CRYPTO ’07, volume 4622 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
360–378. Springer, 2007.
[DFSS05] Ivan B. Damg˚ard, Serge Fehr, Louis Salvail, and Christian Schaffner. Cryptography
in the bounded quantum-storage model. In 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foun-
dations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 449–458, 2005. Full version available at:
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0508222v2.
[DFSS07] Ivan B. Damg˚ard, Serge Fehr, Louis Salvail, and Christian Schaffner. Secure identifi-
cation and QKD in the bounded-quantum-storage model. In Advances in Cryptology—
CRYPTO ’07, volume 4622 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 342–359.
Springer, 2007.
[DKRS06] Yevgeniy Dodis, Jonathan Katz, Leonid Reyzin, and Adam Smith. Robust fuzzy extrac-
tors and authenticated key agreement from close secrets. In Advances in Cryptology—
CRYPTO ’06, volume 4117 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 232–250.
Springer, 2006.
[DM04] Stefan Dziembowski and Ueli M. Maurer. On generating the initial key in the bounded-
storage model. In Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT ’04, volume 3027 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 126–137. Springer, 2004.
[DS05] Yevgeniy Dodis and Adam Smith. Correcting errors without leaking partial information.
In 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 654–663,
2005.
[EPT03] Chip Elliott, David Pearson, and Gregory Troxel. Quantum cryptography in practice.
In SIGCOMM ’03: Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies,
architectures, and protocols for computer communications, pages 227–238, 2003.
[FFS87] Uriel Feige, Amos Fiat, and Adi Shamir. Zero knowledge proofs of identity. In 19th
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 210–217, 1987.
[FS86] Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification
and signature problems. In Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO ’86, volume 263 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 186–194. Springer, 1986.
[FS08a] Serge Fehr and Christian Schaffner. Composing quantum protocols in a classical envi-
ronment. http://arxiv.org/abs/0804.1059, 2008.
[FS08b] Serge Fehr and Christian Schaffner. Randomness extraction via delta-biased masking
in the presence of a quantum attacker. In Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC),
volume 4948 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 465–481. Springer, 2008.
[FS09] Serge Fehr and Christian Schaffner. Composing quantum protocols in a classical envi-
ronment. In Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC), volume 5444 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 350–367. Springer, 2009.
[GL03] Rosario Gennaro and Yehuda Lindell. A framework for password-based authenticated
key exchange. In Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT ’03, volume 2656 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 524–543. Springer, 2003.
19
[KOY01] Jonathan Katz, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Moti Yung. Efficient password-authenticated
key exchange using human-memorable passwords. In Advances in Cryptology—
EUROCRYPT ’01, volume 2045 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 473–492.
Springer, 2001.
[KRS08] Robert Ko¨nig, Renato Renner, and Christian Schaffner. The operational meaning of
min- and max-entropy. http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.1338, 2008.
[KWW09] Robert Ko¨nig, Stephanie Wehner, and Ju¨rg Wullschleger. Unconditional security from
noisy quantum storage. http://arxiv.org/abs/0906.1030, 2009.
[Lo97] Hoi-Kwong Lo. Insecurity of quantum secure computations. Physical Review A,
56(2):1154–1162, 1997.
[Mau90] Ueli M. Maurer. A provably-secure strongly-randomized cipher. In Advances in
Cryptology—EUROCRYPT ’90, volume 473 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 361–373. Springer, 1990.
[NC00] Michael A. Nielsen and Isaac L. Chuang. Quantum Computation and Quantum Infor-
mation. Cambridge university press, 2000.
[NPS07] Jesper Buus Nielsen, Thomas B. Pedersen, and Louis Salvail. Secure two-party quantum
computation against semi-honest adversaries. In preparation, 2007.
[Ren05] Renato Renner. Security of Quantum Key Distribution. PhD thesis, ETH Zu¨rich
(Switzerland), September 2005. http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0512258.
[RK05] Renato Renner and Robert Ko¨nig. Universally composable privacy amplification against
quantum adversaries. In Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC), volume 3378 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 407–425. Springer, 2005.
[STW08] Christian Schaffner, Barbara M. Terhal, and Stephanie Wehner. Robust cryptography
in the noisy-quantum-storage model. http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.1333, to appear in
Quantum Information & Computation (QIC), 2008.
[Tho83] Christian Thommesen. The existence of binary linear concatenated codes with Reed-
Solomon outer codes which asymptotically meet the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 29(6):850–853, 1983.
[WST08] Stephanie Wehner, Christian Schaffner, and Barbara M. Terhal. Cryptography from
noisy storage. Physical Review Letters, 100(22):220502, 2008.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Writing p = P [E ] and p¯ = P [E¯ ] we indeed get
ρX↔Y↔E =
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyE
=
∑
x,y
(
p · PXY |E(x, y) + p¯ · PXY |E¯(x, y)
)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ (p · ρyE|E + p¯ · ρyE|E¯
)
= p2 ·
∑
x,y
PXY |E(x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyE|E + (1− p2) · τ
= p2 · ρX↔Y↔E|E + (1− p2) · τ
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for some density matrix τ . If E is independent of X and Y , so that PXY = PXY |E = PXY |E¯ , then
ρX↔Y↔E =
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyE
=
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗
(
p · ρyE|E + p¯ · ρyE|E¯
)
= p ·
∑
x,y
PXY |E(x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyE|E + p¯ ·
∑
x,y
PXY |E¯(x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyE|E¯
= p · ρX↔Y↔E|E + p¯ · ρX↔Y↔E|E .
⊓⊔
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
For any pair i 6= j let Eij be an event such that P [Eij] ≥ 1− ε and
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi,xj
PXiXjEij |Z(xi, xj |z) ≤ 2−α (2)
for all xi ∈ Xi, xj ∈ Xj and z ∈ Z. By assumption, such events exist.10 For any j = 1, . . . ,m − 1
define
Lj = {(x1, . . . , xm, z) : PX1|Z(x1|z), . . . , PXj−1|Z(xj−1|z) < 2−α/2 ∧ PXj |Z(xj |z) ≥ 2−α/2}
Informally, Lj consists of the tuples (x1, . . . , xm, z), where xj has “large” probability given z whereas
all previous entries have small probabilities. We define V as follows. We let V be the index j ∈
{1, . . . ,m− 1} such that (X1, . . . ,Xm, Z) ∈ Lj , and in case there is no such j we let V be m. Note
that if there does exist such an j then it is unique.
We need to show that this V satisfies the claim. Fix j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Clearly, for i < j,
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi
PXiV Eij |Z(xi, j|z) ≤
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi
PXiV |Z(xi, j|z)
=
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi
PXi|Z(xi|z)PV |XiZ(j|xi, z) < 2−α/2 .
(3)
Indeed, either PXi|Z(xi|z) < 2−α/2 or PV |XiZ(j|xi, z) = 0 by definition of V . Consider now i > j.
Note that
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi
PXiV Eij |Z(xi, j|z) =
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi
∑
xj
PXiXjV Eij |Z(xi, xj , j|z)
≤ 2α/2
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi,xj
PXiXjEij |Z(xi, xj |z) ≤ 2−α/2 ,
(4)
where the last inequality follows from the assumption (2) and the first is a consequence of the fact
that the number of non-zero summands (in the sum over xj) cannot be larger than 2
α/2, because
10 In case ε = 0, i.e., α lower bounds the ordinary (rather then the smooth) min-entropy, the Eij are the events “that
always occur” and can be ignored from the rest of the analysis.
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for any xj with PXiXjV Eij |Z(xi, xj, j|z) > 0, it also holds that PXj |Z(xj |z) ≥ 2−α/2 and the sum
over all those xj would exceed 1 if there were more than 2
α/2 summands. Note that per-se, Eij is
only defined in the probability space given by Xi, Xj and Z, but it can be naturally extended to
the probability space given by X1, . . . ,Xn, Z, V by assuming it to be independent of anything else
when given Xi,Xj , Z, so that e.g. PXiV Eij |Z is indeed well-defined.
Consider now an independent random variableW with Hmin(W ) ≥ 1. By the assumptions onW
it holds that P [V 6=W ] ≥ 12 and PXW VWZ(xi, j, i, z) = PXiVWZ(xi, j, i, z) = PXiV Z(xi, j, z)PW (i).
In the probability space determined by the random variables X1, . . . ,Xn, V,W,Z and all of the
events Eij, define the event E as E := EWV , so that PXW VWE|Z(xi, j, i|z) = PXiVWEij |Z(xi, j, i|z) =
PXiV Eij |Z(xi, j|z)PW (i). Note that
P [E¯ ] =
∑
i,j
PVW E¯WV (j, i) =
∑
i,j
PV E¯ij (j)PW (i) ≤
∑
i,j
P [E¯ij ]PW (i) ≤ mε
and thus P [E¯ |V 6=W ] ≤ P [E¯ ]/P [V 6=W ] ≤ 2mε. From the above, it follows that
pguess(XW , E|V WZ, V 6=W ) =
∑
z,i,j
max
x
PXW VWZE|V 6=W (x, j, i, z) ≤ 2
∑
z,i 6=j
max
x
PXW VWZE(x, j, i, z)
= 2
∑
z,i 6=j
PZ(z) ·max
x
PXW VWE|Z(x, j, i|z) = 2
∑
z,i 6=j
PZ(z) ·max
xi
PXiV Eij |Z(xi, j|z) · PW (i)
= 2
∑
i
PW (i)
∑
j 6=i
∑
z
PZ(z) ·max
xi
PXiV Eij |Z(xi, j|z) ≤ 2m · 2−α/2 ,
where we used (3) and (4) in the last inequality. The claim now follows by definition of Hmin. ⊓⊔
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